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ARTICLES
A TEXTUAL-HISTORICAL THEORY OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
Kurt T. Lash*
Despite the lavish attention paid to the Ninth Amendment as supporting
judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights, surprisingly little attention has been
paid to the Amendment's actual text. Doing so reveals a number of interpretive
conundrums. For example, although often cited in support of broad readings of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the text of the Ninth says nothing about how to
interpret enumerated rights such as those contained in the Fourteenth. The Ninth
merely demands that such enumerated rights not be construed to deny or
disparage other nonenumerated rights retained by the people. The standard use
of the Ninth Amendment, in other words, has nothing to do with its text. The
standard theory of the Ninth also places the text in considerable tension with that
of the Tenth Amendment. Although both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments close
with the same reference to "the people, "most contemporary scholars and courts
treat the same term in the two amendments as having opposite meanings, with the
Ninth referring to a single national people and the Tenth referring to the people
in the several states. This Article addresses these and other textual mysteries of
the Ninth Amendment and constructs a text-based theory of the Ninth that both
explains its historical application and reconciles the Amendment with other texts
in the Constitution, particularly the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the textual mysteries of the Ninth Amendment. The
overall effort is to construct a text-based theory of the Ninth that both explains
its historical application and reconciles the Amendment with other texts in the
Constitution, particularly the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Once dismissed as an indecipherable inkblot,1 the Ninth Amendment2 has
experienced something of a renaissance. A number of recent articles and books
have enriched a previously moribund debate and significantly illuminated the
original understanding of the Clause.3 For example, we now know that the
Amendment played a critical role in the debate over the original Bill of Rights
and almost every major constitutional dispute of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 4 This should finally bury the oft-repeated canard that the
1. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249-55 (1987)
(statement of Judge Robert H. Bork).
2. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
3. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUnON]; Randy E.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2006) [hereinafter
Barnett, Ninth Amendment]; Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment,
83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash, Lost Jurisprudence]; Kurt T. Lash, The Lost
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) [hereinafter Lash,
Original Meaning]. At least one major constitutional law textbook has reworked its
discussion of the Ninth Amendment to take into consideration recent historical evidence
regarding the Ninth. See PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 152-53 (Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed Amar &
Reva B. Segal eds., 5th ed. 2006).
4. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3 (discussing the role of the Ninth
Amendment in the creation of current state law doctrine, slavery, the constitutionality of the
New Deal, and the scope of incorporation doctrine); Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 3
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Ninth Amendment languished in obscurity from the time of its drafting. 5
Second, despite earlier academic (and Supreme Court) pronouncements to the
contrary, there exists a rich corpus of federal and state court opinions referring
to the Ninth Amendment that stretches over the last two hundred years.
6
Although earlier research looked back no further than the time of the New
Deal, we now know that judicial citation to the Ninth Amendment ended at the
time of the New Deal.7 The relative obscurity of the Amendment at the end of
the twentieth century thus is a recent phenomenon, and not a characteristic of
the Amendment from its inception.
The historical application of the Ninth, however, seems to be unrelated to,
or even in tension with, the actual text of the Ninth Amendment. For more than
one hundred years after its adoption, courts and commentators understood and
applied the Ninth as a rule of construction preserving the autonomy of the
states. Almost invariably paired with the Tenth Amendment, the Ninth was
pressed into service in a wide variety of cases involving the need to limit
federal power in order to preserve the right to local self government. States'
rights, of course, is an issue traditionally associated with the Tenth
Amendment-the only amendment in the original Bill of Rights to expressly
mention the states. The Ninth, on the other hand, speaks of the retained rights
of the people. Reading the Ninth as preserving states' rights appears to follow
the approach of the Confederate Constitution which adopted a clause exactly
like the Ninth--except it altered the language to protect the retained rights of
"the people of the several states."8 Such a reading also appears to ignore the
(discussing the role of the Ninth Amendment in delaying the approval of the Bill of Rights,
the first Bank Bill, and the Second Bank of the United States).
5. See CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 9-10 (1995) ("Very little effort has been devoted
to doctrinal argument for the simple reason that a majority of the Supreme Court has never
relied upon the Ninth Amendment as the basis for any decision."); BENNETT B. PATTERSON,
THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 27 (1955) ("There has been no direct judicial
construction of the Ninth Amendment by the Supreme Court of the United States of
America. There are very few cases in the inferior courts in which any attempt has been made
to use the Ninth Amendment as the basis for the assertion of a right."); Randy E. Barnett,
Introduction: James Madison 's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT vii (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1989) ("For all but the last quarter of a century the amendment lay dormant, rarely discussed
and justifiably described as 'forgotten' in the one book devoted to it."); Raoul Berger, The
Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1980) ("Justice Goldberg rescued [the Ninth
Amendment] from obscurity in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut ....");
Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223,
223-24 (1983) ("After lying dormant for over a century and a half, the [N]inth [A]mendment
to the United States Constitution has emerged from obscurity to assume a place of
increasing, if bemused, attention .... Ninth [A]mendment analysis has proceeded in three
stages. In the first stage, which lasted until 1965, the amendment received only perfunctory
treatment from courts and commentators.").
6. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3.
7. Id. at 688.
8. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1861) (emphasis added).
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obvious textual differences between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, with
the Tenth speaking of reserved powers and the Ninth speaking of retained
rights. Powers seems the proper term when referring to prerogatives of
governments (state or federal), whereas the word rights seems intuitively to
refer to the immunities of individuals (not states).
On the other hand, despite the fact that the text of the Ninth appears to lend
itself to the protection of individual rights, advocates of the individual rights
theory of the Ninth have yet to produce a textual theory of the Ninth capable of
judicial enforcement. Supreme Court references to the Ninth Amendment in
early privacy cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe v. Wade1 °
supported an application of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Ninth.
Advocates of a libertarian reading of the Ninth focus on the issue of
nonenumerated rights-a subject that only partially involves the Ninth
Amendment-and have yet to produce a comprehensive theory of the text
itself." Opponents of the libertarian reading of the Ninth, on the other hand,
generally deny that the Clause has any judicially enforceable meaning and
claim that it merely echoes the general federalist declaration of the Tenth
Amendment. 12 Thus, the contemporary debate regarding the Ninth has
proceeded without either side feeling obligated to construct a judicially
enforceable theory of the entire text.
In fact, taking the entire text of the Ninth Amendment seriously leads to
some surprising results. For example, the Ninth Amendment is often cited as
indirect support for a broad interpretation of liberty provisions such as the Due
Process Clause. One cannot reject a due process liberty claim, the argument
goes, on the grounds that no such liberty is listed in the Constitution. Doing so
violates the Ninth Amendment's declaration that there are "other rights"
retained by the people.' 3 When one consults the full text of the Ninth
9. 381 U.S. 479, 484, 487-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
10. 410 U.S. 113, 120, 122, 129 (1973).
11. For example, libertarian scholar Randy Barnett concedes that the Ninth
Amendment may well have protected local majoritarian (collective) rights in addition to
individual natural rights. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 16 ("It is possible
that the 'other' rights retained by the people were both individual and collective, in which
case the collective rights model identifies a potential application of the Ninth Amendment
beyond the protection of individual liberties."); id. at 21, 79 (further conceding that the Ninth
Amendment may have originally protected collective rights). Barnett's theory of the Ninth
Amendment, however, addresses only that aspect of the Ninth Amendment implicating
individual natural rights.
12. See Caplan, supra note 5; Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring):
Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights
protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government .... While the
Ninth Amendment - and indeed the entire Bill of Rights - originally concerned restrictions
upon federal power, the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as
well from abridging fundamental personal liberties.
See also Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 14 (criticizing Carolene Products
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Amendment, however, this argument is revealed as a non sequitur. The Ninth
declares that, no matter the interpreted scope of enumerated rights, there
remains the possible existence of other unenumerated rights. One can have as
narrow a reading of due process rights as one wishes without necessarily
denying or disparaging the existence of "other rights." Thus, the most common
contemporary use of the Ninth cannot be viewed as a command of the text. 14
When one attempts to read the Ninth's text alongside of similar texts in the
Constitution-an approach Professor Akhil Amar refers to as
intratextualisml 5-the mystery deepens. The Ninth closes with a reference to
"the people." This same term closes the text of the Tenth Amendment.
However, despite the fact that these two amendments were placed side by side
and ratified at the same time, contemporary scholarship treats the exact same
language in opposite ways. Courts and commentators have long treated the
closing phrase of the Tenth as a reference to the people in the several states.
Thus, all powers not delegated away from or prohibited to the states are
reserved to the control of the people in the several states. Modem commentary
on the Ninth Amendment, on the other hand, generally views "the people" of
the Ninth as an undifferentiated national body. 16 But if the people hold
reserved powers on a state-by-state basis, why do they not hold retained rights
in the same manner? Or, more bluntly, how likely is it that the same term can
have radically different meanings in side-by-side sentences added to the
Constitution at the same time?
This Article addresses such textual and historical conundrums. Unlike
other contemporary accounts that tend to focus on the issue of unenumerated
rights, I will address the entire text of the Ninth Amendment and consider what
it means to retain a right and how constructions of the Constitution might
threaten to "deny or disparage" the retained rights of the Ninth. Once we see
the Amendment in its entirety, it becomes apparent why courts applied the
Ninth Amendment in a manner preserving the right to local self government for
more than one hundred years: this is the unavoidable operative effect of the text
as a whole.
footnote four, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), for
limiting due process incorporation to textually enumerated rights).
14. As this Article will make clear, although the primary semantic (literal) meaning of
the text is irrelevant to interpretations of other enumerated rights, the secondary or implied
meaning of the Ninth may guide interpretations of other rights. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
15. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 79 (rejecting an interpretation
of "the Ninth Amendment as protecting, at least in part or perhaps even entirely, the
collective rights of 'the people' as embodied in their state governments").
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1. THE PARAMETERS AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE TEXT
The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
This first Part focuses on the text of the Ninth Amendment and attempts to
identify the textual parameters to which any account of the Ninth Amendment
must conform. When appropriate, I will consider the historical record and
attempt to identify which of the possible textual meanings are more or less
plausible, given historical evidence of original public understanding. In this
way, I hope to provide an account of the Ninth Amendment satisfactory in
terms of both originalism1 8 and textualism. 19
All interpretive theories begin with the text; the words of the Constitution
determine the parameters of possible meaning. Although not self-defining, the
very idea of a written, enforceable constitution presupposes a sufficient degree
of agreement regarding language and grammar as to allow judicial enforcement
over time. 20 From the perspective of popular sovereignty, the text is how the
people speak from one generation to the next. Some scholars suggest that
interpreting a written text, by its very nature, requires a form of originalist
analysis. 2 1 Whether this is true, analysis of the text sets the ground rules for any
viable theory of constitutional meaning.
As the Article proceeds, I will distinguish primary textual (or semantic)
meanings of the Ninth from secondary implied meanings arising from the
text.22 For example, as far as the primary meaning of the Ninth is concerned,
the amendment comes into play only when the existence of certain enumerated
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
18. Most originalists today seek not the original intentions of the framers, but the
original public meaning of the text. As described by Lawrence Solum, an originalist judge
should:
make a good faith effort to determine the original meaning, where original meaning is
understood to be the meaning that (i) the framers would have reasonably expected (ii) the
audience to whom the Constitution is addressed (ratifiers, contemporary interpreters) (iii) to
attribute to the framers, (iv) based on the evidence (public record) that was publicly
available.
Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 185 (2006).
19. For a helpful example of an interlocking use of originalism and textualism, see
Amar, supra note 15. Amar's particular approach stresses the need to harmonize similar
terms and phrases used in related passages in the Constitution. I follow the same approach in
this Article.
20. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 50-61 (1999).
21. See id.
22. I wish to thank Larry Solum for first raising with me the important distinction
between semantic textual meaning and implied textual meaning. For a brief explanation of
implied meanings or "implicature," see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Implicature
(May 6, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature.
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rights is construed in a manner that denies or disparages other unenumerated
retained rights. The text does not declare that unenumerated rights actually exist
or that they be affirmatively protected, only that they not be denied or
disparaged due to the existence of certain enumerated rights. On the other hand,
the text does seem to imply that other retained rights exist and ought to be
respected to the same degree as enumerated rights. This implied meaning is a
secondary meaning arising from the text, but not actually required by the text.
As we shall see, the content and scope of implied secondary meanings depends
on what we identify as the primary meaning of the text.
We begin, however, at the beginning: the opening lines of the Ninth
Amendment.
A. "The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights ....
According to contemporary dictionaries, the meaning of "enumeration"
was no different than that commonly understood today: to enumerate meant "to
number" and an enumeration was simply "a numbering or count."2' 3 The
opening phrases, "the enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights" thus
seems clear enough. The "certain rights" enumerated in the Constitution
includes, at the very least, the rights "numbered" or listed in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution. It also seems likely that the reference includes
the rights numbered in Article I, Section 9 (habeas corpus, ex post facto laws,
etc). To the extent that additional support is necessary, this reading is supported
by the history surrounding the adoption of the Ninth. Federalists like James
Madison initially resisted adding a Bill of Rights on the grounds that
enumerating (or listing) certain rights might be read to imply that all
nonenumerated (unlisted) rights were assigned into the hands of the
government. 24 Anti-Federalists responded that such a list of enumerated rights
already existed in Article I, Section 9-thus making the need for some kind of
explanatory amendment even more necessary. 25 In his speech to the House of
Representatives, Madison explained that the Ninth Amendment was meant in
part to address such concerns about the implied relinquishment of rights due to
the enumeration of other rights in the Constitution. The general language of
the Ninth tracks this concern by prohibiting erroneous inferences from the
23. WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 224 (1st Am. ed.,
Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1788), microformed on Early American Imprints, 1st series, No.
21385 (NewsBank, Inc.); see also JOHN ENTICK, ENTICK'S NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY 150
(Wilmington, Peter Brynberg 1800), microformed on Early American Imprints, 1st series,
No. 37375 (NewsBank, Inc.) ("a number or counting over").
24. See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments,
June 8, 1789, in WRITINGS 437, 448-49 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
25. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 28-30 (1999)
(discussing how the Anti-Federalists used the inclusion of restrictions on federal
power in the Constitution to argue for a bill of rights).
26. See Madison, supra note 24, at 448-49.
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enumeration of any right in the Constitution, including those added after the
adoption of the Ninth itself.
27
But what of those rights enumerated in the original Constitution, such as
those listed in Article I, Section 10? Those rights constrain the states and
include the Impairment of Contracts Clause as well as immunity from ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder. Because these rights are among those rights
"enumerate[ed] ... in the Constitution," they fall within the literal meaning of
the Ninth Amendment. If these rights are part of the "enumeration of certain
rights," then one way to read the full text of the Ninth would be as follows:
"The enumeration of certain rights (including those enumerated against the
states in Article I, Section 10) shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained (against the states) by the people." Although textually possible,
historically such a reading is highly implausible. First, we know that Madison's
attempt to add an amendment expressly binding the states failed.28 It seems
unlikely that an express restraint on state action would fail but a text of
unlimited restraint in the form of unenumerated rights against the states would
receive supermajoritarian support. As Chief Justice John Marshall concluded in
Barron v. Baltimore, the overall structure of the Constitution suggests that
general language binds only the federal government, not the states. 29 When one
adds the fact that no one in the history of the Constitution has ever suggested
such a reading of the Ninth, the odds that the "other rights" of the Ninth refers
to unenumerated rights against the states becomes vanishingly small. Put
another way, conventional wisdom is correct in at least this regard: the Ninth
does not involve rights enforceable against the states.
There is, however, a way to read "the enumeration ... of certain rights" in
a manner that includes the rights listed against the states in Article I, Section 10
without embracing the historically implausible interpretation described above.
For example, one could read the text as follows: "The enumeration of certain
rights (including those enumerated against the states in Section 10) shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people (in the several
states)." According to this reading, the fact that some rights are enumerated
against the states shall not be construed to disparage or deny other rights left
under local (state) control. As we shall see, this reading tracks how courts and
commentators read the Ninth in the early years following its adoption and for
decades afterwards. For now, it is enough to conclude that the reference to
certain enumerated rights can include all rights enumerated in the Constitution,
whether against the states or federal government, without doing violence to
either the text or the history surrounding its adoption.
27. Subsequent amendments might change the scope of the Ninth, but nothing in the
original text or history precludes application of the Ninth's rule of construction in reference
to rights enumerated in later amendments.
28. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
29. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-50 (1833).
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B. "... shall not be construed..."
This phrase forms the core of the Ninth Amendment; it is the hub around
which the rest of the text turns. As a matter of semantic meaning, all the Ninth
demands is that the enumeration of rights not be construed in a particular way.
The Ninth Amendment was the first provision added to the Constitution
that solely addressed the issue of interpretation.30 All constitutional provisions,
of course, can be understood as rules of interpretation to some degree. For
example, the Necessary and Proper Clause can be understood both as a
concession of power (literally, for the Clause reads, "Congress shall have
power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper . . ,,),31 and
as a rule of construction (this Clause is properly interpreted to allow only those
laws which are, in fact, "necessary and proper"). Similarly, the Free Speech
Clause can be understood both as a right and as a rule of construction
forbidding any interpretation of congressional power which "abridg[es]
freedom of speech." 32 The Ninth Amendment, however, is neither a grant of
power nor a source of rights.3 3 All that the Ninth Amendment does is forbid
interpreting particular provisions in a particular way. This is what makes the
Ninth Amendment unique: its sole textual function is to control the
interpretation of other provisions.
34
30. The second was the Eleventh Amendment.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988)
("It is a common error, but an error nonetheless, to talk of 'ninth amendment rights.' The
ninth amendment is not a source of rights as such; it is simply a rule about how to read the
Constitution.").
34. This single focus on constitutional interpretation might seem anomalous to us
today, but at the time methods of interpretation were of critical concern. Today,
constitutional treatises present interpretive methodology as a side (and apparently
unresolvable) issue. During the early decades of the Constitution, however, constitutional
treatises spent a great deal of time exploring the basic principles of constitutional
interpretation. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); St. George Tucker, A View of the
Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. 140-339 (St.
George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803). Two years after
the Bill of Rights was ratified, another amendment was added to the Constitution that also
declared a rule of constitutional interpretation. According to the Eleventh Amendment: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis
added). In fact, the issue of proper constitutional interpretation loomed far greater in the
minds of the Founders than any particular enumerated power or right. The Federalists, for
example, believed that proper interpretation of enumerated powers obviated the need for a
list of particular rights. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?"). Those who
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As do a number of provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment
uses the passive voice ("shall not be construed"), leaving it unclear who shall
not construe the Constitution in the forbidden manner. Here, we might be
tempted to follow John Marshall's reasoning in Barron v. Baltimore35 and
conclude that the Ninth's rule of construction applies only against the federal
government. But this is required neither by the text of the Ninth nor Marshall's
decision in Barron. According to Marshall, had the framers intended the Bill of
Rights to serve as "limitations on the powers of the state governments, they
would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have
expressed that intention." 36 The rule of the Ninth Amendment, however, does
not limit the powers of the state governments-quite the opposite, as we shall
see. Like the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth's rule of construction serves to
limit the powers of the federal government. State officials would be as bound to
follow this rule as any federal official. For example, suppose that a state judge
is faced with a claimed federal constitutional right nowhere enumerated in the
Constitution. The Ninth Amendment would prevent the state judge from
concluding that because the right was not enumerated in the Federal
Constitution therefore it was not retained by the people. In fact, all officials,
whether state or federal, are bound by their oaths to support the Constitution
and this includes respecting the rule of construction announced by the Ninth
Amendment.
C. "The enumeration... of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights"
It is generally accepted that one of the central purposes37 of the Ninth
Amendment was to avoid the implication that the Bill of Rights was an
exhaustive list of rights. 38 Just because a right was not specifically enumerated
did not mean the right did not exist. Put another way, the fact that some rights
are enumerated must not be construed to suggest that rights must be
enumerated: the fact of enumeration shall not imply the necessity of
enumeration.
But the text addresses more than the denial of other rights. It also forbids
criticized the lack of a Bill of Rights did not so much disagree with the Federalists on
substantive rights as they feared that proper interpretation of the Constitution would be
ignored without a list of rights declaring the proper interpreted scope of federal power-a list
added "for greater caution."
35. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-50 (1833).
36. Id. at 250.
37. The historical evidence suggests that the Ninth Amendment had dual purposes: (1)
preventing the disparagement of unenumerated rights and (2) limiting the construction of
federal power. See Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment
(Loyola Law School Los Angeles Legal Studies, Paper No. 2006-3, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-953010; see also Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 3.
38. See Madison, supra note 24, at 448-49.
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construing the fact of enumeration in a manner that disparages other rights. As
distinguished from outright denial, disparagement suggests a lessening or
diminishment of retained rights.39 The Disparagement Clause thus prevents an
unwarranted diminishment of retained rights because of their lack of
enumeration. Theoretically, such disparagement might occur in at least two
different ways. For example, the fact of enumeration might be read to suggest a
hierarchy of rights, with enumerated rights occupying a higher status than
nonenumerated rights. The Disparagement Clause prevents this by declaring
that the fact of enumeration shall not imply the superiority of enumeration.
Additionally, disparagement might refer to treating nonenumerated rights as
having a narrower scope than enumerated rights. To prevent this, the Ninth
declares that the fact of enumeration shall not be construed to imply that
nonenumerated rights have a lesser scope than enumerated rights.
These two methods of disparagement (hierarchy and limited scope) are but
different ways of expressing the same idea. For example, courts strongly
disfavor content-based laws that restrict the enumerated freedom of speech in a
public forum. In such situations, courts apply what is called "strict scrutiny"
and demand that the government show that its law is the least restrictive means
of accomplishing a compelling interest. 40 Suppose, however, that a federal
39. According to a contemporary dictionary by Samuel Johnson, "to disparage" meant
"to treat with contempt; to lessen; to disgrace in marriage." See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A SCHOOL
DICTIONARY 53 (New Haven, Edward O'Brien 1797), microformed on Early American
Imprints, I st series, No. 30640 (NewsBank, Inc.). Other contemporary dictionaries contained
similar definitions, generally defining the term as cheapening or lessening in comparison
with something else. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 23, at 203 ("to treat with contempt; to
lessen"); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 211 (5th
ed., Phila., William Young 1789), microformed on Early American Imprints, 1st series, No.
45588 (NewsBank, Inc.) (defining "to disparage" as to "injure by union with something
inferior in excellence"). Usage in newspapers and sermons generally used the term as
meaning "to insult." See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to the Vice President of the
United States and President of the Senate (Jan. 20, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
FINANCE 320, 337 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1834),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html ("It is in vain to disparage
credit, by objecting to its abuses."); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to The Honorable
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 1793), in id. at 202, 209 ("It has been
alleged, to disparage the management under the present .... ."); Miscellanies, THE
WORCESTER MAGAZINE, July 17, 1788, at 1 ("And least of all does it become [a man] to
disparage the [female] sex."); Of Imprecations, BOSTON GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., May 5,
1788, at 4, microformed on Early American Newspapers Series 1-3 (NewsBank, Inc.) ("[I]11
men never gain credit but disparage themselves [through their use of oaths and insults].");
Roger Viets, Rector of Digby, A Sermon on the Duty of Attending the Public Worship of
God (Apr. 19, 1789), microformed on Early American Imprints, 1st series, No. 22223
(NewsBank, Inc.) ("'Tis as easy to commend our neighbor as to disparage him"). All of
these uses (insult, lessen, cheapen by inferior comparison) carry the connotation of
diminishment.
40. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (applying strict scrutiny to laws
regulating speech on the Internet on the basis of adult content); Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (explaining the doctrine and rationale behind
applying strict scrutiny in the public forum).
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court refused to provide the same level of scrutiny for a nonenumerated right
on the grounds that only enumerated rights should receive strict scrutiny. For
the purpose of our analysis, it does not matter what degree of scrutiny is
actually applied, only that the level of scrutiny is less for unenumerated rights.
The simple fact that scrutiny is lower due to the fact of nonenumeration is
enough to render this interpretation in violation of the Ninth Amendment. It
lessens the "strength" of the retained right and renders it less immune to
government regulation. Put another way, this approach disparages the
unenumerated right.
In a similar manner, the Disparagement Clause prevents treating
enumerated rights as superior to nonenumerated rights. For example, suppose
the people of a given state pass a law providing a means by which marriage
contracts may be dissolved (such as no-fault divorce). The law is challenged on
the grounds that it violates Article I, Section 10, which prohibits any state law
impairing the obligation of contracts. In such a case, if a court holds that the
impairment of contract clause trumps the people's collective right to regulate
marriage because one is enumerated and the other is not, then this construction
violates the Ninth Amendment. It construes the fact of enumeration in a manner
that disparages nonenumeration. 4 1 This rule does not control the outcome of the
case; it merely prohibits one particular interpretive approach to resolving the
issue.
D. The Ninth Amendment and Enumerated Rights
A common argument regarding the Ninth Amendment is that it supports, in
some way, a particular (and generally broad) interpretation of enumerated
rights such as the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In terms of the text, however, the Ninth has nothing to
say about how enumerated rights ought to be construed beyond forbidding a
construction that denies or disparages nonenumerated rights.
Consider the following argument:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates only
those rights enumerated in the first eight amendments.
Some judges and scholars argue that this limited reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment violates the Ninth Amendment by "denying or disparaging" other
nonenumerated rights.42 In fact, the above argument does not affect
41. This example is drawn from the discussion by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627-28 (1819).
42. Randy Barnett, for example, criticizes footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), for limiting the content of the substantive Due
Process Clause to just those incorporated rights that are listed in the text of the Constitution.
See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 254 ("[T]he pure Footnote Four approach is undercut by the
original meaning of both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments."); id. ("Also inconsistent
with the Ninth Amendment is the third and current Footnote Four-Plus approach that
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nonenumerated rights in any manner. A limited reading of the enumerated right
to due process says nothing about whether other rights are retained beyond
those encompassed by the enumerated right. It neither denies their existence
nor disparages their scope. For example, during the nineteenth century, courts
often considered whether a claimed right fell within an enumerated right in the
federal or state constitutions. Even if the court read the enumerated federal
rights narrowly, there remained the additional question of whether the claimed
right was nevertheless a nonenumerated natural right retained by the people of
a given state as a matter of state law. Calder v. Bull and Fletcher v. Peck are
both examples of this methodology.
4 3
In terms of the literal semantic meaning of the text, then, a narrow
construction of an enumerated right does not deny or disparage nonenumerated
rights. Accordingly, reading the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate nothing but the particular rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights does not violate the rule of construction declared by the Ninth
Amendment.44 Whatever nonenumerated rights may be, by definition they exist
outside the parameters of enumerated rights.
45
On the other hand, consider the following argument:
The fact that a claimed right is listed nowhere in the Constitution, including
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, means that there is no such
retained right.
Unlike a limited reading of an enumerated right, this argument goes further
and relies on the fact of enumeration to deny the existence of other rights
retained by the people. This violates the Ninth Amendment's rule of
construction. In this situation, it is not the limited construction of enumerated
elevates some unenumerated rights to the exalted status of 'fundamental' while disparaging
the other liberties of the people as mere 'liberty interests."'); Casey L. Westover, Structural
Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding the Proper Balance Between State
Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 693, 707 (2005) ("Of course, there
is no 'right to privacy' provision in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution, but,
as Justice Douglas rightly pointed out, that cannot end the analysis-'[t]he Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""); see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (citing the Ninth Amendment in
support of a right to procure an abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing the Ninth Amendment in support of a woman's
unenumerated due process right to obtain an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Ninth supports reading
unenumerated rights into the Due Process Clause).
43. See Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 401-09 (discussing the state-law
approach to natural rights in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), and Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)).
44. But see Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 14, 77 (arguing that Carolene
Products footnote four violates the interpretive principle of the Ninth).
45. As I discuss later, there may be an implied meaning of the Ninth that affects the
scope of enumerated rights, but such an implied secondary meaning depends on the primary
semantic meaning.
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rights that denies or disparages other nonenumerated rights. Instead, it is the
court's refusal to recognize rights beyond those enumerated which denies or
disparages those rights. Again, it matters nothing to the Ninth Amendment how
broadly or narrowly enumerated rights are read, only that they not be construed
to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.
The above must be distinguished from reliance on the Ninth Amendment
as indirect or circumstantial support for a particular reading of a separate
amendment. Depending on one's view of the Ninth, it could be used in general
support of a broad (or narrow) reading of provisions such as the Due Process or
Privileges or Immunities Clauses. But these secondary or implied meanings of
the Ninth are contingent upon the primary meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
4 6
For example, if the Ninth protects unenumerated individual natural rights (and
only individual natural rights), then this might lend circumstantial support to a
similar reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, the Ninth
may have been intended to preserve the retained rights of the people to local
self government. If so, this counsels against reading the Ninth in support of
broad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that unduly
interfere with local autonomy.
In sum: The Ninth Amendment prevents interpretations of enumerated
rights that negatively affect unenumerated retained rights. Neither unduly
narrow nor excessively broad interpretations of enumerated rights violate the
Ninth Amendment, as long as the fact of enumeration is not relied upon to
suggest the necessity or superiority of enumeration. It is possible to use the
Ninth as implied or indirect support for general theories of broad--or narrow-
constructions of enumerated rights, but these secondary theories depend on the
primary meaning of the Ninth Amendment (and this, in turn, depends on one's
theory of constitutional interpretation).
E. The Other Rights Retained by the People
Much of the discussion surrounding the Ninth involves the nature of the
"other[] [rights]" retained by the people. The meaning of the term is not self-
evident, if only due to the fact that the concept of rights has undergone
conceptual development since the Founding.47 But even if one limits the
investigation to the Founding period, common usage of the term rights
46. Randy Barnett, for example, links the Ninth to concerns about individual natural
rights, and relies on this reading to support a similar reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. This is implicit in his argument that the incorporation doctrine of Carolene Products
footnote four (which involves an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause) violates the principles of the Ninth Amendment. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment,
supra note 3, at 14, 77.
47. See, e.g., WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23-64 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1919) (introducing a typology of rights which remains influential in contemporary legal
and political theory).
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included-and this is a nonexclusive list: (1) alienable and unalienable natural
rights;48  (2) positive rights;4 9  (3) individual rights;50  (4) collective
revolutionary rights;5 1 (5) majoritarian democratic rights; and (6) the retained
rights of the sovereign states.? 2 Any or all of these may have been understood
as comprising the retained rights of the people.
The innovation of a federal system of government adds yet another wrinkle
to our understanding of retained rights circa 1791. Under the Articles of
Confederation, "each state retain[ed] its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power jurisdiction and right [not] expressly delegated
to the United States."5 3 It then remained up to the people of each state whether
to delegate those retained powers and rights to their state government, or retain
them to the people of the state under their individual state constitution. For
example, this is how the New York Convention phrased the retained rights of
the people in that state:
[T]he powers of government may be reassumed by the people, whenever it
shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction and
right, which is not by the said constitution clearly delegated to the congress of
the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to
the people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to
whom they may have granted the same .... 54
As New York's declaration illustrates, from the time of the Articles
onward, the people had a variety of choices when it came to "retained rights."
They could (1) retain rights from the federal government but leave them to state
control; (2) retain rights from state governments but delegate them to federal
control; or (3) retain them from both state and federal control. Each of these
scenarios involves rights retained by the people in one form or another. We are
left, then, with a variety of rights that could be retained in a variety of ways.
48. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (referring to the
unalienable rights of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness); see also JOHN LOCKE,
(SECOND) TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980)
(1690).
49. See Madison, supra note 24, at 448-49 (speaking of the positive rights secured
under the proposed Bill of Rights such as trial by jury).
50. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Benson) (discussing the unenumerated individual right of a man to "wear his hat if he
pleased" or "go to bed when he thought proper").
51. See Madison, supra note 24, at 441 (proposing an amendment declaring "that the
people have the indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their
government").
52. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
53. See id.
54. Declaration of the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT, supra
note 5, at 356.
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Although scholars often associate the "other (retained) rights" of the Ninth
with individual natural rights,55 the text itself carries no such limitation. In fact,
there is strong historical support for the proposition that the retained rights of
the people were considered so vast as to not be capable of enumeration.
56
Certainly no Founder (including James Madison) limited the protections of the
Ninth to a particular kind of right. 57 As a matter of both text and history, the
"other rights retained by the people" remains an unrestricted term. It can be
read quite broadly, potentially including everything from freedom of speech, to
the right to sleep on one's left side, to the right of local majorities to decide
public education policy. In other words, the "other rights" of the Ninth
potentially include all rights capable of being retained by the people, whether
natural, positive, individual, majoritarian, collective or even governmental.5 8
This is a critical point about the text of the Ninth Amendment: much
scholarly work has gone into establishing that retained rights at the time of the
Founding included individual natural rights.59 I think such work is persuasive.
However, a great deal turns on whether individual rights were the only rights
retained under the Ninth Amendment and whether all retained rights (individual
and otherwise) were left to the control of state majorities. The remaining text of
the Ninth Amendment itself provides some clues, as do closely related texts in
the rest of the Bill of Rights.
F. "[O]thers retained by the people"
A retained right is a right withheld from government control. 60 The
opposite of a retained right is an assigned right--one delegated to government
control. This is how Madison explained the distinction in his speech
introducing his proposed Ninth Amendment to the House of Representatives:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
55. See generally MASSEY, supra note 5; Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3;
Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1001 (1988).
56. See, e.g., James Wilson, Remarks in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov.
28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388
(1976) ("In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly
enumerated.").
57. Professor Caplan argues that retained rights are those protected under the state
constitutions. See Caplan, supra note 5. The historical evidence, however, suggests a much
broader conception of retained rights. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. At this
point I wish only to point out that the text does not include Caplan's limitation.
58. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 53, 54
(Northampton, Mass. 1805) (1758) (describing the natural rights of nations).
59. See BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 3; MASSEY, supra
note 5.
60. According to contemporary dictionaries, "to retain" meant "to hold in custody,"
PERRY, supra note 23, at 438, or simply "to keep," SHERIDAN, supra note 39, at 501.
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particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by implication,
that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into
the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure.6 1
According to Madison, the concern about adding a Bill of Rights was that
all unenumerated rights would be "assigned" into the hands of the general
government. It was to avoid this erroneous delegation of power that Madison
proposed the Ninth Amendment. Thus, preventing erroneous denial or
disparagement of retained rights, by definition, means preventing erroneous
enlargement of government power over that particular subject.
1. The dual nature of retained rights
We know that, in theory, rights may be retained against either federal or
state governments (or both). For example, although the First Amendment
prohibited the federal government from establishing religion, the people
retained the right to establish religion on a state level subject only to the
constraints of state law. Thus, the people of Massachusetts retained from the
federal government the right to tax people for the support of churches and
clergy but nevertheless assigned that right into the hands of their state
government (and continued to do so until 1833).62 Prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to regulate religion at a local level remained a
right retained by the collective people of each state.
Under the Federal Constitution, retained rights thus had a dual nature. They
could be both retained and delegated at the same time, depending on the level
of government at issue (federal or state). This dual nature of retained right was
highlighted in one of our earliest constitutional controversies. When the Adams
administration passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison joined others in
criticizing the Acts as violating the First and Tenth Amendments. 63 Madison
argued that, because the First Amendment denied the federal government
control over the retained right to freedom of speech, the Tenth Amendment left
seditious libel under the control of the people in the several states.64 In this
way, the Sedition Act violated the individual right to free speech and the
61. Madison, supra note 24, at 448-49.
62. See John Wite, Jr., "A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion ": John
Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213 (1999).
63. See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, January 7, 1800, in
WRITINGS, supra note 24, at 608. Despite its title, Madison's Report actually focused on the
controversial Virginia Resolutions of 1798. See id. at 608. ("The committee have deemed it a
more useful task to revise with a critical eye the resolutions which have met with this
disapprobation."). For a discussion of the report and its relevance to debates over the Ninth
Amendment, see Lash, supra note 37.
64. See Madison, supra note 63, at 610-11 (explaining and defending the claim in the
Virginia Resolutions of 1798 that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated the rights of the
states).
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people's collective right to regulate speech on a state level.65
Libertarian theories of the Ninth Amendment miss this critical dual nature
of retained rights. To begin with, there is no reason to limit retained rights to
66individual rights (as libertarian scholars like Randy Barnett concede). But
most important, although retained rights may be individual or collective, the
Ninth always guards the people's collective right to control the retained matter
on a state level. For example, suppose one of the retained rights of the people is
the right of self-defense. Should the federal government attempt to deny or
disparage this right because it is not specifically enumerated, it would violate
the Ninth Amendment. As a retained individual right, it would be left to the
people of each state to determine how and when the right to self-defense would
(or would not) be regulated. Although one might argue that the principles of
natural law preclude denying the right even on a state level, this would be a
matter for state courts to decide and, ultimately, the people of each individual
state.
6 7
Suppose, on the other hand, that the federal government in 1792 decided
that the right to self-defense was a natural right and that states were not
adequately protecting this fundamental right. Accordingly, Congress passes the
"Federal Self Defense Act" requiring states to protect to the individual right of
self-defense. Unless the law is a necessary and proper means for advancing an
enumerated federal responsibility, the Act would violate the reserved powers of
the states as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. Allpowers not delegated (or
prohibited) are reserved to the states. This is true even if one accepts the
proposition that the personal right to self-defense is a retained natural right of
the people. In this way, a retained right might be individual in nature but
collective in terms of the combined effect of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Although later constitutional amendments (such as the Fourteenth) may limit
65. The Sedition Act involved an enumerated right (freedom of speech), but retained
unenumerated rights would work in the same way. All rights retained from the federal
control would be left to the control of the people in the several states.
66. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 16 (conceding the possibility that
the Ninth protected collective rights).
67. This is precisely how the Supreme Court approached claims of natural rights in
cases such as Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See Lash, Original Meaning, supra
note 3, at 403; see also DE VATTEL, supra note 58, at 55 ("A nation then has a right to
perform what actions it thinks fit, both when they do not concern the proper and perfects
rights of any other [nation], and when it is bound to it only by an internal without any
perfect external obligation. If it makes an ill use of its liberty, it offends; but others ought to
suffer it to do so, having no right to command it to do otherwise. . . . It is therefore
necessary, on many occasions, that nations should suffer certain things to be done, that are
very unjust and blamable in their own nature, because they cannot oppose it by open force,
without violating the liberty of some particular state, and destroying the foundation of
natural society."). The work of de Vattel was well known at the time of the Founding and
was frequently cited by early constitutional theorists such as St. George Tucker. See, e.g.,
Tucker, supra note 34, at app. 151 (linking the work of de Vattel with the principles of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
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the category of rights left to state majoritarian control, this does not change the
operative effect (much less original purpose) of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
Once we recognize how the Ninth and Tenth Amendment work in tandem
to keep certain matters under local control, it becomes clear that "the people" of
the Ninth are no different than "the people" of the Tenth. The Tenth declares
that all powers not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the
states are reserved to the states or to the people. It has never been seriously
disputed that this is a reference to the people's right (whether viewed as a
national people or as the people in the several states) to reserve certain powers
to the control of local majorities who may at their discretion assign them into
the hands of their state governments. Following what Akhil Amar refers to as
intratextualism,6 8 it seems logical that the same term in an adjoining provision
adopted by the same people at the same time would have the same meaning.
We can confirm that the term "the people" meant the same thing in both
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments by reference to a generous historical record.
But before doing so, once again there is additional support for such a reading in
the texts of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. We know that retained rights, by
definition, are rights not delegated to the control of the federal government.
This seems clear enough from the term "retained", and it was expressly
declared by the drafter of the Ninth, James Madison.69 Retained rights,
therefore, are powers not delegated to the national government. Under the text
of the Tenth Amendment, all nondelegated powers are reserved to the states
unless otherwise prohibited to the states by the Constitution. The only issue,
therefore, is whether the retained rights of the Ninth involve matters
"prohibited" to the states. This cannot be so, of course, for this would mean that
all unenumerated rights are automatically withheld from both the state and
federal governments. As explained above, there is no plausible historical
argument that this was the understood meaning of the Ninth Amendment. It
would result in the absurd scenario where the expressly enumerated retained
rights of speech and nonestablishment would be left to local majoritarian
control, but all unenumerated retained rights would be automatically removed
from state control.7 °
Reading the Ninth Amendment in light of the textual commands of the
Tenth allows for a harmonization of the texts. By reserving nondelegated
powers "to the States respectively, or to the people," 7' the Tenth allows the
people of each state to decide whether their respective governments will
exercise the nondelegated powers, or whether the people will reserve this
68. See Amar, supra note 15.
69. Madison, supra note 24, at 448-49.
70. The result becomes even more absurd when one considers the possibility of
retained collective rights, such as the right to regulate education on a local level. This kind of
collective right cannot logically be retained from state control.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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power from both the federal and their state governments. For example, the
federal government has no power to require music education in the public
schools. Power to mandate the content of public education is reserved to the
states respectively or to the people. This leaves the people of, say,
Massachusetts free to require music education through a majoritarian decision
of their legislature or to deny such power to their state government and reserve
the right to the people as a matter of individual choice.
Once harmonized with the Tenth, retained rights under the Ninth
Amendment work in a similar, though nonredundant, manner. 72 The retained
rights of the people include those rights withheld from the federal government
and under the control of the people on a state-by-state basis. The people of a
given state may, however, assign control over these retained rights to their
respective state governments. This is one of the core sovereign rights of the
people and, again, by definition, such an assignment would occur on a state-by-
state basis.
In sum, the text of the Ninth Amendment does not affect the interpretation
of enumerated rights such as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (or any other enumerated right). The text is solely concerned with
constructions that deny or disparage unenumerated rights. The term "rights" is
unrestricted, and there is nothing in the text of the Ninth to suggest that it refers
to only a subcategory of retained rights (whether individual or majoritarian).
Because "retaining" a right, by definition, means leaving that right to the
majoritarian control of the people in the states, all retained rights are federalist
in their operative effect in that they are retained to the majoritarian control of
the people in the several states.
II. THE TEXT AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD
A. Contemporary References to the Retained Collective Rights of the People
The idea that retained rights were collective or federalist in nature is
strongly supported by the historical record as well as by the text of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. The testimony we have from the drafter of the Ninth
(James Madison), the members of Congress who voted to propose the Ninth,
and the members of the state assemblies who ratified the Ninth, are unanimous
in describing the Ninth as a guardian of the sovereign rights of the people in the
several states. Courts and commentators echoed this same understanding of the
meaning and operative effect of the Ninth Amendment for over one hundred
years.
To begin with, the historical record includes examples of the framers,
ratifiers, and early Supreme Court Justices describing the right of local self
72. For a discussion of the separate and distinct roles of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, see infra Part III.A.
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government as one of the retained rights of the people. According to Ninth
Amendment draftsman James Madison, "In establishing [the federal]
Government, the people retained other Governments capable of exercising such
necessary and useful powers as were not to be exercised by the General
Government."
73
Notice that Madison describes "the people" as having retained their local
(state) governments. In coming together to form a national people, the people
of the individual states retained their right to control matters "not to be
exercised by the general government." This same idea is echoed by the state
conventions that ratified the Constitution. According to the declaration of the
New York Ratifying Convention:
The powers of government may be reassumed by the people, whenever it shall
become necessary to their happiness; that every power jurisdiction and right,
which is not by the said constitution clearly delegated to the congress of the
United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the
people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom
they may have granted the same.
74
Once again, "the people" are described as retaining the autonomy over
local government. The collective people of New York, in this case, reserved the
authority to delegate any or all retained "power jurisdiction and right" to their
state government, if they wished to do so. Nor was this mere wishful thinking
on the part of Anti-Federalists who "lost" the debate over the proposed
Constitution. We have already seen how Madison shared the same view of the
retained right of the people to local government. Early Supreme Court
decisions confirmed this common reading of the retained collective rights of
the people in the states. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, whose 1797
opinion in Calder v. Bull is regularly cited in support of a libertarian reading of
the Ninth Amendment, expressly declared that all retained rights are left to the
local control of state majorities. While sitting as a judge on Maryland's highest
court, Justice Chase wrote, "All power, jurisdiction, and rights of sovereignty,
not granted by the people by that instrument, or relinquished; are still retained
by them in their several states, and in their respective state legislatures,
according to their forms of government."
75
73. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 359, 362 (Marvin
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER] (emphasis added).
74. See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, at 21-22; see also 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONs 329 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
Co. 1891).
75. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554-55 (Md. 1797); see Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) ("It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several
State Legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the State
Constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY taken away by the Constitution of the United
States."); see also Douglass' Adm'r v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 489, 502 (1819) ("By the
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There were, of course, disputed conceptions of "the people" in decades
following the adoption of the Constitution. Indeed, the precise nature of "the
people" remained a fiercely contested issue in the period between the Founding
and the Civil War 77 -and even after.78 For our purposes, however, one need
not decide whether "the people" refers to the undifferentiated people of the
United States, or the separate people(s) in the several states, or-as Madison
apparently believed-both. As far as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
concerned, the result is the same whether one sees the people through a
nationalist or federalist lens. All sides of the debate agreed that, however
conceived, "We, the People," had the sovereign right to divide power between
the national and local governments. 79 As Madison put it, "the people retained
other governments capable of exercising such necessary and useful powers as
were not to be exercised by the General Government." 80 In this way, "the
Constitution of the United States all power, jurisdiction, and rights of sovereignty, not
granted by that instrument, or relinquished, are retained by the several states.").
76. One of the most hotly contested issues in constitutional interpretation in the early
decades of the Constitution regarded whether the Constitution was a compact between the
people of the individual states or a document establishing a single, national, and sovereign
people. Early constitutional treatise writers such as St. George Tucker embraced the former,
while nationalists like Joseph Story and John Marshall embraced the latter. For a general
discussion of the competing positions, see Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule": St. George Tucker
and the Limited Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2006). All
sides in this debate, however, believed that all nondelegated powers, jurisdiction, and rights
were left to the control of the people in the individual states.
77. Compare Tucker, supra note 34, with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 (1988) (discussing the debate between compact theorists and
nationalists like Story and Marshall).
78. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (majority and
dissenting opinions presenting conflicting views regarding the nature of the "people of the
United States").
79. Although some Anti-Federalists complained that the Tenth Amendment's
reference to "the people" might be read as consolidating the nation into a single unitary
mass, Federalists denied the claim, and moderates had no difficulty in reading the clause as
reserving nondelegated power to the people of the individual states. Compare Letter from
Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 74, at 295-96 (complaining about the language of the Tenth Amendment), with
Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 56, at 223
("The twelfth [the Tenth] amendment does not appear to me to have any real effect, unless it
be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every particular state, as to what is
delegated. It accords pretty nearly with what our convention proposed.").
80. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), supra note 73, at
362; see also JAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 22 (Boston, Samuel Hall 1791) ("Sovereignty must by its very nature be
absolute and uncontrolable by any civil authority, with respect to the objects to which it
extends. A subordinate sovereignty is nonsense.: A subordinate uncontrolable sovereignty is
a contradiction in terms: But there may be a political sovereignty, limited as to the objects of
its extension: It may extend to some things, but not to others, or be vested for some purposes,
and not for others.").
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people" of both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments could be viewed as referring
to We the People of the United States, and the retained rights and powers of the
people in the individual states.
8 1
B. The Collective People of the Ninth Amendment
This federalist view of the people's reserved rights was not limited to "the
people" of the Tenth Amendment. Framers, ratifiers, and early Supreme Court
Justices shared a similar view of the people's retained rights under the Ninth
Amendment. In his 1791 speech against the proposed Bank of the United
States, James Madison argued that federal power did not extend to chartering a
Bank and that stretching the enumerated powers of Congress to include such
power would violate the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. According to Madison,
the Ninth "guard[ed] against a latitude of interpretation" while the Tenth
"exclud[ed] every source of power not of exercising the within the Constitution
itself."'82 Madison concluded that chartering a Bank violated the rights of the
state to charter banks free from federal interference. 83 Madison's use of the
Ninth is a stark example of how the retained rights of the Ninth included state
majoritarian rights.
There is evidence that Madison's colleagues in the House shared the same
view of the Ninth Amendment. John Page, a member of the House when
Madison proposed the Bill of Rights, also described the Ninth as protecting
both the rights of individuals and the states. In his 1799 campaign pamphlet,
John Page argued that the Alien and Sedition Acts were "not only unnecessary,
impolitic, and unjust, but unconstitutional. '84 According to Page, the Acts
violated the retained rights of the states as protected by the Ninth and Tenth
81. For additional Founding-era examples of references to "the people" on a state
level, see SULLIVAN, supra note 80, at 37 ("As individuals retain all the powers under a free
government, which are not surrendered by the form of their constitution, so all the powers,
which existed in the governments of the several states before the establishment of the general
government, are yet held by them, excepting those which the people have taken back, and
surrendered by that system."); Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 80,
at 362 ("Within a single state possessing the entire sovereignty, the powers given to the
government by the People are understood to extend to all the acts whether as means or ends
required for the welfare of the community, and falling within the just range of
government.").
82. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791),
in WRITINGS, supra note 24, at 480, 489.
83. Id. at 490.
84. JOHN PAGE, ADDRESS TO THE FREEHOLDERS OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 9 (Richmond,
John Dixon 1799). Page was a member of Congress from 1789 to 1797 and Governor of
Virginia from 1802 to 1805. Library of Congress, Congressional Biographical Directory,
http://bioguide.congress.gov. Thus, not only was he in Congress when Madison gave his
bank speech, he was a representative from Virginia at the time that state was considering the
Bill of Rights. He would have been well aware of Madison's opposition to the bank-
indeed, the men regularly corresponded.
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Amendments (which he refers to as the 11 th and 12th "articles"):
The power therefore which congress has claimed and exercised in enacting the
alien act, not having been granted by the people in their constitution, but on
the contrary having been claimed and hitherto wisely and patriotically
exercised by the state legislatures, for the benefit of individual states, and for
the safety of the general government, must be amongst those powers, which
not having been granted to congress, nor denied to the states, are declared by
the 11 th and 12th articles of the amendments to the constitution to be reserved
to the states respectively, and therefore the alien act is an encroachment on
those rights, and must be unconstitutional. . .. 85 [And the Act is further
unconstitutional b]ecause it is an interference with, and an encroachment on,
the reserved rights of the individual states, (see the 1 th and 12th articles of
the amendments) .... 86
Hardin Burnley, a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, supported
ratification of the Ninth Amendment on the grounds that the provision would
"protect[] the rights of the people & of the States."87 John Overton, a member
of the second North Carolina Ratifying Convention that ratified the Ninth
Amendment, similarly viewed the Ninth as working alongside the Tenth to
preserve the retained state right of "self-preservation." Writing as a judge on
the Tennessee bench, Overton declared:
[N]ations as well as individuals are tenacious of the rights of self-preservation,
of which, as applied to sovereign States, the right of soil or eminent domain is
one. Constitutions, treaties, or laws, in derogation of these rights are to be
construed strictly. Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is more satisfactory, the
Federalist, and the American author of the Notes to Blackstone's
Commentaries [Tucker], two of the most eminent writers on jurisprudence, are
of the same opinion.
8 8
St. George Tucker, Professor at the College of William and Mary from
1788-1804, wrote in his influential View of the Constitution that the Ninth
Amendment guarded the people's collective right to alter or abolish their form
of government. According to Tucker, under the principles of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, "the powers delegated to the federal government, are, in
all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear,
where the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually,
may be drawn in question."8 9 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, in the first
Supreme Court opinion to discuss the Ninth Amendment, read the Ninth as
preserving the concurrent powers of state majorities. 90
85. PAGE, supra note 84, at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Letter from Hardin Bumley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 56, at 219.
88. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith, I Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 166 (1805) (citing the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments).
89. Tucker, supra note 34, at app. 154.
90. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 20-21 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
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These are but a few examples of historical testimony by those immediately
involved with creating and ratifying the Ninth Amendment, as well as early
scholarly and judicial commentary. As I have presented elsewhere, the
historical record contains literally hundreds of additional references to the
Ninth Amendment as a provision reserving all retained rights, individual and
majoritarian, to the control of local majorities. 9 1 The historical record thus
strongly supports my reading of the text.92 There is no evidence that the term
"rights" was understood in a restrictive manner, but there does exist extensive,
uncontradicted evidence that the term was understood to preserve local control
of both individual and majoritarian rights.
C. Summing Up the Semantic Meaning of the Text
The text of the Ninth Amendment forbids constructions that deny or
diminish rights retained by the people on a state-by-state basis. Put another
way, the text forbids constructions that interfere with the retained right to local
self government. Even those retained rights that are individual in terms of their
application against the federal government are collective in terms of their being
retained under local majoritarian control.
Embedded in the text of the Ninth, thus, are two separate forbidden rules of
construction: First, the fact of enumeration must not be read to imply the
necessity of enumeration. Second, the fact of enumeration must not be read to
suggest the superiority of enumeration. Whatever the content of unenumerated
retained rights, the fact that they are not enumerated does not suggest a lower
status. Finally, nothing in the text of the Ninth forbids narrow interpretations of
enumerated rights. Such interpretations, even if in error, do not deny or
disparage other unenumerated retained rights.
III. INTRATEXTUALISM: THE TEXT OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION
The text of the Ninth Amendment does not stand alone, but is integrated
into the overall text of the Constitution-and a proper construction of the Ninth
must likewise integrate the Ninth into the rest of the constitutional text.
Because the above analysis reads the Ninth as preserving the prerogatives of
state majorities, the question arises whether this renders the Ninth redundant
with the Tenth Amendment. Also, even if the Ninth was originally understood
as a guardian of local autonomy, later amendments substantially altered the
original federalist structure of the Ninth Amendment. The Fourteenth
91. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3; Lash, supra note 37.
92. Even the strongest proponent of a libertarian reading of the Ninth Amendment
concedes that the historical evidence supports a federalist reading of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 5.
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Amendment in particular seems to remove whole categories of rights from
local control and place them under the protection of the national government. It
is possible that the Fourteenth Amendment radically altered the scope and
function of the Ninth Amendment, thus rendering its original meaning
irrelevant. The following section seeks to reconcile the Ninth with the Tenth
and Fourteenth Amendments in a manner that leaves all three with independent
meaning and application.
A. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments
My analysis of the text and history of the Ninth Amendment might seem to
render the Ninth and Tenth Amendments redundant guardians of state rights.
Closely examined, however, the text of the two amendments reveals related
provisions imposing somewhat overlapping, but distinct, constraints on federal
power. The Tenth limits the federal government to only enumerated powers.
The Ninth limits the interpretation of enumerated powers. Both provisions are
necessary if federal power is to be effectively constrained.
In the ratification debates, Federalist advocates of the Constitution
promised that the federal government would have only certain enumerated
powers, leaving all nondelegated powers, jurisdiction, and rights to the
individual sovereign states. As Madison explained in the Federalist Papers, this
left the great mass of regulatory authority over everyday matters in the hands of
state majorities. 93 Federalists justified the lack of a Bill of Rights on the
grounds that adding a list of enumerated rights might imply that federal power
had no limits beyond those expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
The problem with this argument, as Anti-Federalists pointed out, was that
the proposed Constitution already had a list of enumerated rights in Article I,
Sections 9 and 10. Thus, there already existed the potential for implied (and
otherwise) unlimited federal power. In order to win a sufficient number of
votes to ratify the Constitution (and avoid a second convention), Madison
agreed to propose a Bill of Rights. There remained, however, the problem of
how to do so without implying an otherwise unlimited interpretation of federal
power. An obvious solution, and one proposed by most state ratifying
conventions, was the addition of a clause expressly declaring that Congress's
powers were limited to those enumerated in the Constitution, with all other
non-delegated non-prohibited powers remaining with the states. Madison
obligingly adopted such an approach by proposing what became our Tenth
Amendment.
But, by itself, the Tenth was inadequate if the goal was preventing the
federal government from extending itself into all areas except those expressly
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.").
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declared off-limits in a Bill of Rights. The Necessary and Proper Clause
granted Congress the power to exercise unenumerated powers when "necessary
and proper" to advancing an enumerated end. It was possible that Congress
might attempt to extend its enumerated powers by way of this Clause to such a
degree as to effectually arrogate to itself all powers except those expressly
denied in the Bill of Rights. Should Congress do so, this would not violate the
express terms of the Tenth Amendment, 94 for it would be no more than an
exercise of those means necessary to advancing delegated powers. It would,
however, have the effect of completely obliterating the people's retained right
to local self government beyond those subjects expressly listed in the Bill.
Preventing this undue extension of implied powers requires a rule of
construction controlling the interpretation of enumerated federal power. The
Ninth Amendment declares that there exist restrictions on federal power
beyond those expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Such a rule can have no
other application except in regard to the limited construction of enumerated
federal power.
In this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments accomplish the same goal of
limiting the scope of federal power, but do so in different ways. The Tenth
limits the government to enumerated ends, while the Ninth Amendment limits
the scope of Congress's implied means to advance those enumerated ends. In
particular, the Ninth prohibits the federal government from claiming that the
only limit to its "necessary and proper powers" are those expressly enumerated
in the Constitution. The people have other rights that also constrain the scope
of enumerated federal power. Applied in tandem (as they invariably were),9 5
the Ninth and Tenth establish that all retained powers and rights are left under
the control of the people in the states who may then delegate the same to their
state governments, or expressly retain them under their state constitution. Not
only does this reading of the text reconcile the Ninth with its historical
application, but it also has the happy effect of giving the same meaning to "the
people" in both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
B. The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
The debate over the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment began
with its enactment and shows no sign of abating a century and a half later.96 It
94. It is possible to read the Tenth Amendment in a manner that would preclude such a
broad construction of federal power. I explore the historical evidence supporting such a
reading in a forthcoming article. Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The
Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty and "Expressly " Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. (forthcoming May 2008).
95. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3.
96. For a small sample of contemporary scholarship addressing the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY (2005); AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 28; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No
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is not necessary for our purposes to resolve this debate and specifically define
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 The text alone allows for some
general conclusions about the relationship of the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, regardless of the ultimate determined scope of provisions such as
the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clause.
1. The Ninth Amendment and incorporation doctrine
After establishing the national and state citizenship of all persons bom in
the United States, the next sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that "no state shall" abridge the privileges or immunities of United
States citizens or deny any person the right to due process or equal protection
under law. This restriction on state power carves out a portion of rights
previously retained by state majorities and places them beyond the reach of the
political process. The current scholarly debate involves the content of these
rights; for example, whether they include some or all of the first eight
amendments, or whether they (also) include certain unenumerated rights such
as the right to privacy or the common law right to pursue a trade.98 No scholar
or judge has ever suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Ninth Amendment. From the earliest incorporation cases to modem doctrine,
the Court has consistently limited the scope of incorporation doctrine to the
first eight amendments.
99
The history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
supports the long-standing position of the courts that neither the Ninth nor
Tenth Amendments are proper candidates for incorporation. Throughout the
first half of the nineteenth century, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
viewed as preserving the autonomy of the states. Despite the incentive to raise
every possible liberty claim in opposition to slavery, abolitionists never
referred to the Ninth Amendment in support of their cause. Instead, in the years
leading up to the Civil War, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
invoked on behalf of slavery and the right of states to secede from the
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1990); as
well as the work of John Harrison and Raoul Berger, among others.
97. In my own work, I have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should be
interpreted as having incorporated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, but not the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 1085 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994).
98. See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed
Amar's The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 485 (1999) (book review).
99. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 673-74. In fact, courts originally
cited the Ninth Amendment to support rejecting a theory of total incorporation. See id at
675.
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Union.100 It is no surprise then that the man who drafted Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, left both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments off of his list of individual privileges or immunities protected
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 1 In sum, the testimony of
courts and commentators is unanimous on at least this issue: the Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate the Ninth.
But if the retained rights of the Ninth are not part of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then they must be reconciled with the Fourteenth. All of the rights
now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment originally fell within the category
of rights removed from the federal government and left as an initial matter
under the control of the people in the states. This includes everything from
chartering a bank to establishing a religion to providing due process for
deprivation of life liberty and property. What in 1791 had been left to the
collective control of the people in the states, after 1868 became a matter of the
individual rights of "United States citizens" and "persons" (to use the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment). More, what was once under the Ninth a
statement of powers denied to the federal government becomes under Section 5
of the Fourteenth a declaration of powers delegated to the regulatory authority
of the federal government. In this way, the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
altered the scope of the Ninth.
But not all of the rights originally retained under the Ninth were subsumed
by the Fourteenth. The collective majoritarian rights protected under the Ninth
cannot logically be applied against collective state majorities any more than the
reserved powers of the Tenth Amendment can be applied against the states. For
example, assuming local control of education was an original right retained by
the people, this right cannot sensibly be applied against state majorities. The
same would be true for all retained collective or majoritarian rights. These
remnant unenumerated rights remain under the protection of the Ninth to the
extent that they have not been abrogated (or transformed) by the Fourteenth.
2. Reconciling the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
We know from our textual analysis of the Ninth Amendment that the fact
of enumeration does not imply the necessity or superiority of enumeration.
Accordingly, the remnant unenumerated retained rights of the Ninth (post-
100. See id. at 639-42.
101. John Yoo points out that state constitutions during the nineteenth century adopted
provisions echoing the language of the federal Ninth Amendment. See John Choon Yoo, Our
Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993). Although I think this is important
evidence that the language of the Ninth could be viewed to support individual rights, these
state constitutional provisions cannot trump the extensive express testimony regarding the
public understanding of the federal clause itself. Unlike the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, which appear to have been embraced as individual rights provisions by the Civil
War, no such transformation appears to have occurred with the Ninth Amendment. See Lash,
Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 643-52.
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1868) are no less important than the enumerated rights of the Fourteenth. This
seems to follow logically from our analysis thus far. It leads, however, to a
critical (and perhaps startling) conclusion: the enumerated rights of the
Fourteenth Amendment must not be construed in a manner that denies or
disparages the remnant retained rights of the Ninth. Moving beyond the bare
semantic meaning of the Ninth, the text of the Ninth also seems to imply that
the rights of the Fourteenth should not be unduly extended in a manner that
intrudes upon the people's retained right to local self government. For example,
Congress ought not to unduly extend its powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that wrongly intrudes upon a matter meant
to be left to state control even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The need to limit the scope of potentially clashing rights is not without
precedent. The Court limits the scope of the Establishment Clause in order to
avoid impinging upon the right to free speech. 10 2 Similarly, reconciling the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments requires limiting the reach of the
Fourteenth in order to avoid impinging upon the unenumerated retained rights
of the Ninth (and vice versa). For example, suppose that Congress decides that
the states have failed to adequately educate children in music and the arts.
Believing that this denial violates substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress exercises its power under Section 5 of that
amendment and passes a law providing a private cause of action for any
individual denied "adequate opportunity" to receive training in music and the
arts. Further assume (as the Court would surely hold), that this kind of positive
right to a state funded education goes beyond the scope of enumerated rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 3 As such, the law infringes the
retained right of local majorities to decide educational policy free from federal
interference.
The same would be true should Congress attempt to pass the same law as
necessary and proper to advancing their power to regulate interstate
commerce. 104 Congress is no more free to unduly extend their powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment than they are under Section 8 of
Article .105 This does not mean the earlier Ninth Amendment trumps the later-
in-time Fourteenth. It does mean that the Ninth prevents, in Madison's words,
102. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisor Bd. v. Pirmette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(ruling that the Establishment Clause should not be so broadly construed as to prohibit
private religious speech in a public forum).
103. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding that
education is not a "fundamental right" that requires heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause).
104. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
105. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the
Violence Against Women Act); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating
portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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any "latitude of interpretation"' 106 that impinges upon any of the retained rights
of the people.
The above analysis should look familiar to those who followed the
federalist jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Cases like City of Boerne v.
Flores10 7 and United States v. Morrison1° 8 use a similar limited analysis of
Congress's power under Section 5 in order to preserve the autonomy of the
states. The Court grounded this jurisprudence, however, in the Tenth
Amendment, not the Ninth.' 0 9 Elsewhere I have traced the rise of the Tenth
Amendment as a rule of construction and how it came to eclipse the Ninth as
the prime textual expression of limited federal power." 0 In fact, the Ninth and
Tenth were generally cited in tandem throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as the twin guardians of federalism."' l Both clauses,
however, fell into judicial disfavor at the time of the New Deal and by the time
the Rehnquist Court began to reinvigorate the principles of federalism, the
Ninth Amendment had been "rediscovered" by the Warren and Burger Courts
and adopted as a declaration of uneneumerated individual rights. 12 This left
the Tenth as the prime constitutional reference to the principle of federalism.
The text of the Tenth Amendment, of course, does not expressly declare a rule
of strict construction. 113 The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much,
11 4
and critics of the modem federalism jurisprudence have been quick to point out
the lack of textual justification for decisions like Boerne and Morrison, as well
as other federalism decisions like Lopez and Printz 15 A textual theory of the
106. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, February 2,
1791, in WRITINGS, supra note 24, at 480, 489.
107. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
108. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
109. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). For a general discussion of the Rehnquist Court's reliance on the Tenth
Amendment in its federalism decisions, see Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's Celebrated
Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165
(2006).
110. Lash, supra note 109.
111. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3.
112. Id. at 708-13.
113. As I will argue in a forthcoming paper, the last-minute addition of"or to the
people" to the Tenth Amendment may have been understood to imply the need for strict
construction of federal power according to the principles of popular sovereignty. See Lash,
supra note 94.
114. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) ("The Tenth
Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment itself .... Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States.").
115. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 288-93
(2000); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 899 (1999); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
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Ninth Amendment, however, supports the federalist approach of these
decisions with the additional benefit of historical support.
The idea of limiting the construction of rights enumerated against the states
in order preserve state autonomy might sound like a modem invention of the
Rehnquist Court. In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall himself advanced this
very theory of limited construction of rights running against the states.
According to Marshall in Dartmouth College:
[E]ven marriage is a contract, and its obligations are affected by the laws
respecting divorces. That the [Impairment of Contracts Clause] in the
constitution, if construed in its greatest latitude, would prohibit these laws.
Taken in its broad, unlimited sense, the clause would be an unprofitable and
vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a state, would
unnecessarily and unwisely embarrass its legislation, and render immutable
those civil institutions, which are established for purposes of internal
government, and which, to subserve those purposes, ought to vary with
varying circumstances. . . The general correctness of these observations
cannot be controverted. That the framers of the constitution did not intend to
restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for
internal government, and that the instrument they have given us, is not to be so
construed, may be admitted.
1t 6
According to Marshall, rights enumerated in the Constitution against the
states should not be construed in a manner that unduly interferes with the
internal concerns of a state. This is a rule of construction that limits an
enumerated right in order to preserve the autonomy of the states. Marshall did
not cite the Ninth Amendment, but his approach tracks the implied meaning of
the text and its historical application. Unless the Fourteenth Amendment
repealed the Ninth Amendment sub silencio, the nature of retained
unenumerated rights remains the same after 1868, even if the scope of those
rights has been significantly reduced. Indeed, the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment has no impact on the operative effect of any remnant retained
unenumerated right. Because these remnant unenumerated rights retain full
value, the fact that some rights are enumerated (such as those listed in the
Fourteenth Amendment) does not diminish in any way the equal importance of
other retained rights.
IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The judicial branch is constrained by the Ninth Amendment just as much
as the political branches. So, for example, courts must not construe the
enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution to imply otherwise
unconstrained federal power.117 In fact, it seems that only a studied avoidance
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 927-28 (1994).
116. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627-29
(1819).
117. This fits within the semantic meaning of the Ninth, for a conclusion that federal
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of the Ninth Amendment could explain the Marshall Court's declaration that
congressional power "acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution,"' 118 for this too violates the express terms of the Ninth by
suggesting that the fact of enumeration implies the necessity of enumeration. 
119
Courts do not violate the Ninth Amendment, however, if they limit the
scope of substantive due process to textual rights such as those listed in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution.1 20 Although some Ninth Amendment
theorists believe such a limited reading of due process conflicts with the
Ninth, 12 1 that such a reading does not deny or disparage the existence of other,
unenumerated rights. As discussed above, narrow construction of enumerated
rights has no effect on the other rights retained by the people. To the extent that
the Due Process Clause (or, better, the Privileges or Immunities Clause)
protects unenumerated rights against state action, the precise content of such
rights must be identified through an act of interpretation focused on that
particular clause and not on the basis of the Ninth Amendment.
Moreover, the text of the Ninth Amendment seems to prohibit an
unenumerated rights interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The people's
retained rights include collective majoritarian rights which, by definition,
cannot be applied against the states. Even in regard to retained unenumerated
individual rights, the text leaves these under the control of the people in the
several states absent an express mandate in the Constitution itself. As John
Marshall explained in Barron v. Baltimore, the framers of the Constitution
employed express language when they meant to bind the states. This rule of
construction was not abandoned with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment-indeed, the drafters of the Fourteenth expressly followed the rule
of Barron.12 2 To the degree that the Reconstruction Amendments require the
states to protect certain fundamental rights, this must be the result of a textual
interpretation of express provisions like the Due Process or Privileges or
Immunities Clause. If privacy and other individual autonomy rights are to be
applied against the states, it must be on the merits of the Fourteenth
power is otherwise unconstrained contains the unstated premise that unenumerated rights do
not have the same constraining effect as enumerated rights. In this way, reading federal
power as having no other constraints except those enumerated in the Constitution denies or
disparages other rights retained by the people.
118. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
119. For a discussion of the Marshall Court's repeated refusal to address the Ninth
despite its being raised by parties before the Court, see Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note
3, at 604-09.
120. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (rejecting
the unenumerated right to contract, but suggesting that there may be room for stricter
scrutiny of rights listed in the Bill of Rights); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (suggesting that the Court should apply strict scrutiny in cases
involving the incorporation of rights specifically listed in the Bill of Rights).
121. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 3, at 14.
122. See AMAR, supra note 28, at 164.
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Amendment itself and not an implied absorption of the retained unenumerated
rights of the Ninth.
A. Towards a Theory of Judicial Enforcement
The above analysis establishes that the Ninth Amendment limits the undue
extension of enumerated federal powers and rights against state majorities.
Undue extension of either threatens rights meant to be retained by the people.
This is not complicated as a matter of theory. However, even if we have
correctly identified the original meaning of the Ninth, we are left having to
construct a doctrine that effectuates the meaning of the text.
One could argue, of course, that judicial enforcement of the Ninth
Amendment is inappropriate. Perhaps the protection of local self government
should be left to the political branches under the assumption that the structure
of the Constitution adequately protects the states from federal overreaching. As
the Supreme Court noted in Garcia, states can utilize their representative status
in the House and Senate (as well as the Electoral College) and arguably counter
undue expansion of federal authority to the detriment of the states. 123 The
difficulty with this theory, however, is that it leaves enforcement of the
people's right to self government to state governments who may have an
incentive to bargain away their autonomy in exchange for federal benefits. As
the text of the Ninth reminds us, however, the retained rights guarded by the
Ninth are the retained rights of the people. Only the people in their sovereign
capacity may waive or alter the federalist division of power between national
and local governments.
The man most responsible for the Ninth Amendment, James Madison, was
adamant about the need for judicial enforcement of the line between federal and
state authority. According to Madison, "the permanent success of the
Constitution depend[ed] on a definite partition of powers between the general
and state governments." 124 It was "of great importance as well as of
indispensable obligation, that the constitutional boundary between them should
be impartially maintained." 125 Madison objected to the Marshall Court's broad
reading of federal power because it "seem[ed] to break down the landmarks
intended by a specification of powers of Congress, and to substitute for a
definite connection between means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to the
former to which no practical limit can be assigned."' 126 By making "expediency
& constitutionality" convertible terms, the Supreme Court had relinquished "all
controul on the legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers" and placed the
123. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
124. James Madison, Veto Message, March 3, 1817, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER, supra note 73, at 307.
125. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER, supra note 73, at 363.
126. Id. at 359.
[Vol. 60:895
February 2008] TEXTUAL-HISTORICAL NINTH AMENDMENT
federalist limits of federal power "beyond the reach of judicial cognizance." 127
To Madison at least, judicial enforcement of the people's retained rights was
"indispensable."
In fact, if limited to its semantic meaning, judicial enforcement of the
Ninth is fairly straightforward. Courts must not construe the fact of
enumeration in a manner that denies or disparages retained rights. The only
time the semantic meaning comes into play is when a court or government
official insists that the fact of enumeration suggests the necessity or superiority
of enumeration. The underlying principle of the Ninth, however, implies the
existence of retained rights beyond those expressly enumerated in the
Constitution. Federal authority was not meant to extend to all areas of life
except those expressly placed off-limits. Put another way, the text of the Ninth
Amendment suggests a preexisting limitation on federal power-a limitation
enforceable by courts in situations beyond those triggered by the primary
semantic meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Exactly how the courts should effectuate the secondary implied principles
of the Ninth Amendment is a matter of constitutional construction as opposed
to a particular doctrine mandated by the text of the Ninth Amendment. 128 As
usual, James Madison provides us an early sketch of such a constructed theory
of judicial enforcement of the people's retained unenumerated rights. In his
1791 speech against the Bank of the United States, Madison laid out the
following principles of interpretation:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the government
cannot be just....
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be
collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the
meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree of its
incidentality to an express authority, is to be regarded, but the degree of its
importance also; since on this will depend the probability or improbability of
its being left to construction. 129
The "very characteristic of the government" Madison insisted on protecting
involved limited, enumerated federal power as envisioned by the ratifying
conventions and declared in the statements they submitted when they ratified
the Constitution. This characteristic would be destroyed if Congress could
extend their implied powers to include "great and important powers" never
,, . ,,130
meant to be "left to construction. The rule of limited construction of federal
power was implicit in the Constitution itself, but expressly declared by the
127. Id. at 360.
128. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between constitutional interpretation
and constitutional construction, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 7-14.
129. Id.
130. Id.
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, "the former, as guarding against a latitude of
interpretation-the latter, as excluding every source of power not within the
constitution itself."13 1 In this particular case, Madison argued that the power to
charter a bank or any other corporation was a great and important power that
required express enumeration. The attempt to construe the enumerated powers
of the federal government to include such a charter altered the essential nature
of limited government and, therefore, violated the retained rights of the states
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Madison's opponents on the Bank Bill objected that Madison had taken a
mere policy debate and turned it into a matter of "rights." 132 In fact, Madison
treated the federalist division of power as a right reserved to the people in the
states, and his approach to guarding that right is quite similar to the modem
Court's application of strict scrutiny. Responding to Spencer Roane's criticism
of the Court's interpretation of federal power and jurisdiction in Cohens v.
Virginia, Madison wrote that when it came to the exercise of federal power,
"the means of execution should be of the most obvious and essential kind; &
exerted in the ways as little intrusive as possible on the powers and police of
the states."' 133 Thus, laws affecting the states must be "obvious and essential"
(compelling) and executed in a manner "as little intrusive as possible" (that is,
by using the least-restrictive alternative). This approach also echoes the modem
Court's interpretation of federal power in cases like Lopez, which require an
actual nexus with interstate commerce, 134 and the "proportional and congruent"
test of Congress's Section 5 powers articulated in Boerne.135 Again, it has been
common to view these decisions as application of the "spirit" of the Tenth
Amendment. The same jurisprudence, however, could be applied under the
Ninth Amendment with greater textual and historical justification.
In addition to reserving certain subjects to local control, the Ninth
Amendment also counsels against construing federal power as exclusive of
concurrent state authority, unless absolutely necessary. Some of the earliest
applications of the Ninth Amendment involved the question of concurrent
versus exclusive federal power. Those favoring a presumption in favor of
current state authority cited the Ninth Amendment in support of a limited
reading of exclusive federal power. In Houston v. Moore, the first Supreme
Court opinion to discuss the Ninth Amendment, Justice Joseph Story agreed:
The constitution containing a grant of powers in many instances similar to
131. Madison, supra note 82, at 489.
132. See Memorandum from Roger Sherman to James Madison (Feb. 4, 1791), in 13
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981)
("The only question that remains is-Is a Bank a proper measure for effecting these
purposes? And is not this a question of expediency rather than of rights?").
133. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), supra note 125, at
365.
134. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 49, 558 (1995).
135. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
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those already existing in the State governments, and some of these being of
vital importance also to State authority and State legislation, it is not to be
admitted that a mere grant of such powers in affirmative terms to Congress,
does, per se, transfer an exclusive sovereignty on such subjects to the latter.
On the contrary, a reasonable interpretation of that instrument necessarily
leads to the conclusion, that the powers so granted are never exclusive of
similar powers existing in the States, unless where the constitution has
expressly in terms given an exclusive power to Congress, or the exercise of a
like power is prohibited to the States, or there is a direct repugnancy or
incompatibility in the exercise of it by the States. . . .In all other cases not
falling within the classes already mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the
States retain concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the letter and
spirit of the [ninth] amendment 9f the constitution,136 but upon the soundest
principles of general reasoning.
At issue in Houston was whether the states had concurrent authority along
with the federal government to discipline the militia once it was called into
active duty. One of Houston's arguments was that the sole power of the states
to regulate on matters involving the militia was contained in the "reservation"
clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 16.138 That clause, after granting
Congress power to organize and discipline the militia, reserved to the states
"the Appointment of the officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."' 139 Houston argued that
this reservation implied that all power not expressly reserved to the states was
exclusively in the hands of Congress. 140 Story rejected this argument, applying
the rule of construction he believed declared by the Ninth Amendment:
It is almost too plain for argument, that the power here given to Congress over
the militia, is of a limited nature, and confined to the objects specified in these
clauses; and that in all other respects, and for all other purposes, the militia are
subject to the control and government of the State authorities. Nor can the
reservation to the States of the appointment of the officers and authority of the
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, be
justly considered as weakening this conclusion. That reservation constitutes an
exception merely from the power given to Congress 'to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia;' and is a limitation upon the
136. Story here refers to the "eleventh amendment," reflecting an early terminology
which listed the provisions of the Bill of Rights in terms of their placement on an original list
of twelve proposed amendments. The Ninth and Tenth were the eleventh and twelve articles
on the original list. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 614-15. Even absent this
historical convention, it is clear from the text that Story is, in fact, referring to the Ninth. See
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 21 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting) (explaining, in the
same discussion, that "what is not taken away by the Constitution of the United States, must
be considered as retained by the States or the people").
137. Houston, 18 U.S. at 20 (Story, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
138. Id. at 4-6 (majority opinion).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
140. Houston, 18 U.S. at 4 (stating that Houston argued that "the constitutional power
of Congress over the militia, is exclusive of State authority").
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authority, which would otherwise have developed upon it as to the
appointment of officers. But the exception from a given power cannot, upon
any fair reasoning, be considered as an enumeration of all the powers which
belong to the States over the militia. 141 What those powers are must depend
upon their own constitutions; and what is not taken away by the Constitution
of the United States, must be considered as retained by the States or the
people. The exception then ascertains only that Congress have not, and that
the States have, the power to appoint the officers of the militia, and to train
them according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Nor does it seem
necessary to contend, that the power 'to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia,' is exclusively vested in Congress. It is merely an
affirmative power, and if not in its own nature incompatible with the existence
of a like power in the States, it may well leave a concurrent power in the
latter. 142
Notice that Story's opinion (which remained influential for decades),
provides a literal application of the Ninth Amendment in a case dealing solely
with the majoritarian right to local self government. The fact that the states are
granted some rights in terms of regulating the militia shall not be construed to
deny or disparage other unenumerated regulatory rights over the militia
retained by the states or the people. Reading federal power to be exclusive in
this case was both unnecessary and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Ninth
Amendment.
B. Summary
Early discussion and application of the Ninth Amendment present at least
three separate rules of application. First, and most obviously, the fact that some
rights are enumerated must not be construed to suggest a lack of other
unenumerated rights retained to the states or to the people. Second, the greater
and more important a power, the more likely its absence from the enumerated
powers of Congress reflects a determination to leave the matter under the
control of local governments. Third, in determining the boundary between
national and local authority, federal power should be construed to extend only
to those means "obvious and necessary" to advancing an enumerated end. Not
only are courts authorized to patrol this boundary, they are duty-bound to
maintain the line separating state and federal authority and guard local
autonomy as one of the retained rights of the people.
The first rule is a straightforward application of the text. Obscured by the
modem emphasis on individual rights, the text points beyond libertarian
political theory and protects all unenumerated rights, including the collective
141. At this point in the online Westlaw transcription of the case there is an error:
"What those powers are must other. Nor has Harvard College any surer title than
constitutions." The text quoted above is taken from the United States Reports and contains
no noticeable errors.
142. Houston, 18 U.S. at 3 (Story, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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right of the people to local self government. The Ninth Amendment thus
grounds federalism in the text of the Constitution and establishes it as a
constitutional right. Because such rights cannot be denied or disparaged on
account of their unenumerated status, this places collective majoritarian rights
on equal ground with enumerated individual rights. Both are to receive equally
vigorous judicial protection. Although generally associated today with the
Tenth Amendment, it is the text of the Ninth that calls for a limited
construction of enumerated federal power in order to avoid disparaging the
right of the people to keep certain matters under local control.
The second rule suggests there are some powers which, even if plausibly
"necessary and proper" to the advancement of an enumerated end, nevertheless
are of such important or critical nature as to require specific enumeration. This
rule falls within the scope of the Ninth Amendment because it involves limiting
the construction of enumerated federal power in order to avoid denying a right
meant to be retained by the people. 143 In essence, it establishes a method for
identifying a retained right. Once again, we can find analogies in the modem
jurisprudence of the Tenth Amendment. Cases like New York v. United
States144 and Printz v. United States145 involved whether Congress could
exercise their necessary and proper powers in a manner that commandeered
state legislators or state officials. According to the Court in Printz, "Although
the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government,
they retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty." '" 46 Allowing federal
control of state authorities would critically undermine the federalist separation
of powers, for "[i]t is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority."' 147 Nor was there any historical evidence suggesting "that the
Federal Government may command the States' executive power in the absence
of a particularized constitutional authorization .... " 148 The power to
"commandeer" state governments in the service of federal policy was of such a
significant nature that it required specific enumeration, even if Congress could
establish this means as necessary and proper to an enumerated end. 149
143. James Madison's argument regarding the need to expressly enumerate great and
important powers was acknowledged by Alexander Hamilton in his defense of the Bank. See
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 119 (Harold C. Cyrettt ed., 1965). The same rule was pressed by
litigants in McCulloch v. Maryland and implicitly accepted by John Marshall in his opinion,
though without citing the Ninth Amendment as the textual expression of the rule. See 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 373-74, 411 (1819).
144. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
145. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
146. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
147. Id. at 928.
148. Id. at 909.
149. The same rule would apply to interpretation of federal power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment. Caleb Nelson, for
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Finally, as a constitutional right, legislative encroachment on the autonomy
of local majorities must be justified as meeting an obvious and essential
enumerated federal responsibility. It was essential to Madison that the scope of
Congress's implied powers not be left to the discretion of the political
branches, but judicially determined and enforced. In reviewing the scope of
federal power, courts were to ensure that "the means of execution should be of
the most obvious and essential kind; & exerted in the ways as little intrusive as
possible on the powers and police of the states."' 150 Madison's rule implies the
need to establish a sufficient nexus between the chosen means and the
enumerated end. Or, as the Supreme Court has suggested, Congress may not
"pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States." 15 1 The Supreme Court's late nineteenth
century Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been criticized as drawing
artificial distinctions between matters that "directly or indirectly" affected
interstate commerce. Similar criticism has been leveled at the current Court's
distinction between commercial and non-commercial local activity. Artificial or
not, such distinctions can be viewed as attempts to require a sufficient nexus
between implied and enumerated power. The issue is not simply whether the
asserted power arguably implicates a federal responsibility, but whether
allowing such an extension effectively erases the distinction between matters
local and matters national-a distinction mandated by both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
In addition to requiring a sufficient degree of nexus, the third rule requires
that federal power be "exerted in the ways as little intrusive as possible on the
powers and police of the states." 152 For example, even if Congress has
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect free exercise
of religion against certain state actions, the scope of justified congressional
action depends upon the degree of state interference with an enumerated right.
Or, as the Court has put it, congressional action must be "congruen[t] and
proportional[]" in light of the identified problem. 153 The Ninth Amendment
demands that the unenumerated rights of the people have equal status with
enumerated rights. Thus, a line must be drawn between retained majoritarian
rights and enumerated individual rights in a manner that gives both equal
regard and respect. The same rule applies, of course, to all exercises of
example, has suggested just this kind of limitation on federal jurisdictional power, though he
attributes the rule to an independent limitation on the scope of federal power. See Caleb
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARv. L. REv.
1559, 1640 (2002).
150. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), supra note 73, at
365.
151. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
152. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), supra note 73, at
365.
153. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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congressional power.
Strict scrutiny is generally reserved for government actions that impinge
upon protected rights. The text of the Ninth Amendment reminds us that
maintaining an area of retained local autonomy is itself a right of the people. As
early constitutional treatise writer St. George Tucker explained, under the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, "the powers delegated to the federal government, are,
in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear,
where the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually,
may be drawn in question."'
154
CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL
The case law I have drawn upon is generally associated with the Tenth
Amendment-based federalism jurisprudence of the current Supreme Court. In
many ways, the textual theory I have presented in this paper, both primary-
semantic and secondary-implied, amounts to the modest proposal that this
jurisprudence be grounded in the Ninth, and not the Tenth Amendment. Doing
so would have the benefit of placing that jurisprudence on firmer textual and
historical ground. There are various normative justifications for doing so. To
the extent that one's constitutional theory is based on the concept of popular
sovereignty, both the text and historical record suggest that the people insisted
on preserving areas of community life beyond the reach of the federal
government. The normative case for federalism, of course, has been and will
continue to be a subject of intense debate. Once associated with intransigent
state resistance to desegregation, the notion of states' rights today has a more
progressive ring. Recent claims of the right to local self government involve
not entrenched racism, but the right to implement affirmative action programs.
Issues such as the medicinal use of marijuana and physician-assisted suicide
also raise issues of local self government. Thus, even apart from popular
sovereignty theory, modem theories of justice and personal autonomy may find
utility in a federalist system of divided power.
In the end, however much power has been delegated into the hands of the
federal government, the text of the Ninth Amendment reminds us that we retain
innumerable liberties, both individual and majoritarian. Drawing the line
between rights assigned and rights retained requires drawing a line between
federal and local control. This separation of power is one of the fundamental
rights of the people.
154. See Tucker, supra note 34, at app. 154.
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